Doing Business in Mexico: A Practical Legal Analysis by Radway, Robert J.
Doing Business in Mexico:
A Practical Legal Analysis
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I. The Foundation and Its Main Pillars
Four areas of Mexican law are particularly significant to foreign compa-
nies doing business in Mexico. These laws are the Foreign Investment Law,'
the Transfer of Technology and Inventions and Trademarks Laws,2 the Ma-
quiladora or In-Bond Assembly Program,3 and the recently issued Incentive
Program for Industrial Development. 4 Periodic modification of these laws,
perhaps as a result of changing economic conditions or otherwise, results in
generally flexible application to continue to permit United States and other
foreign business to engage in profitable business operations in Mexico. Cur-
rent economic and social conditions in that country would appear to call for
increased flexibility and occasional exemption from "Mexicanization" rules,
with a continued emphasis on and trend towards joint ventures with majority
Mexican partners, and continued loosening of import restrictions to permit
huge expenditures of the foreign exchange from oil revenues for capital
goods and technology to feed the massive industrial expansion.
*Mr. Radway practices law in New York City.
'Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, DIARIO OFFICIAL
[D.O.] March 9, 1973. [hereinafter cited as Foreign Investment Law].
'Law on the Registration of Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents
and Trademarks, D.O., Dec. 30, 1972; Law on Inventions and Trademarks, D.O. Feb. 10, 1976
[hereinafter cited as Industrial Property Code].
'Programa Nacional Fronteriza, Address by Minister Campos Salas, Ministry of Industry and
Commerce (Aug. 1965).
'The program was established by a series of four Federal Executive Decrees: Feb. 2, 1979
(Decree which estabishes geographical zones for the execution of the Program of Incentives for
the Territorial Deconcentration of Industrial Activities as anticipated in the national Plan of
Urban Development); March 6, 1979 (Decree that establishes Fiscal Incentives for the Develop-
ment of Employment and Investment in Industrial Activities); March 9, 1979 (Agreement that
establishes the Fiscal Incentives for the Development of Employment and Investment in Indus-
trial Activities); March 19, 1979 (Decree that orders the execution of the National Plan of
Industrial Development and establishes the bases for its fulfillment).
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II. History of Foreign Investment in Mexico
The Foreign Investment Law, actually the "Law to Promote Mexican In-
vestment and to Regulate Foreign Investment," became effective May 8,
1973. The name suggests the trend established in the Mexican Constitution in
1917 but unrealized until shortly after the nationalization of the petroleum
industry by President Cardenas in 1938. By the early 1940s, the emphasis was
on attempting to direct foreign capital into the production of goods and
services for internal consumption and not merely for export. This was partly
due to the effects of World War II and a drastic reduction of imports under
those circumstances. On June 29, 1944, an emergency decree regulating for-
eign flight capital during the war years granted authority to the Ministry of
Foreign Relations to authorize, limit or condition foreign investment. All
foreign investment was required to be registered, and received a permit upon
entering the country in order to prevent capital from coming in, displacing
Mexican capital, and departing after the war, leaving Mexican investors on
the sidelines and devastating the infrastructure. The Ministry of Foreign Re-
lations' broad powers to decide on a case-by-case basis the merits of each
transaction involving new foreign investment has continued to the present
day.
In 1959 the Administration adopted the policy that the firms producing
raw materials should be in a minority position with a majority Mexican
partner. This was a sign of developments which were to unfold over the next
two decades. In 1960 the electric power companies were nationalized with no
significant disruption to foreign investment. The need for import substitu-
tion gave impetus to the economic doctrines of the 1960s. By the mid-1960s,
the Administration continued the strong emphasis on mixed investments with
a majority of Mexican capital.
In July 1970 an important decree was promulgated which prohibited for-
eign investment in certain well-established and important economic activi-
ties. It reserved five sectors to the State and eight others to companies wholly-
owned by Mexicans. The sectors closed to foreign investment were electricity,
banks, insurance companies and related financial services, and all the areas
previously reserved for majority Mexican ownership such as communica-
tions, transportation, fishing, and the like. This merely ratified the practice
which had developed informally, since these areas were already dominated by
Mexican firms. But this decree also extended the requirement of majority
Mexican ownership to steel, cement, glass, fertilizers, cellulose, aluminum
mining, chemicals and rubber. In some cases, such as steel, this formalized
what had already been achieved. In other cases, however, this was to strongly
affect new investments. Moreover, since these restrictions applied to expan-
sion programs of existing companies, they represented a strong incentive for
such companies to seek local partners. This resulted in several large United
States firms selling majority control to Mexican groups in the early to mid-
1970s.
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Two later decrees also formalized previous practice. A decree in February
1971 reserved the basic petrochemical industry to the State, and required 60
percent Mexican ownership for companies processing secondary petrochemi-
cals. In mining companies, 66 percent Mexican ownership was required. A
subsequent decree in October 1972 established the requirement for 60 percent
Mexican ownership in companies manufacturing automobile parts.
III. The Foreign Investment Law
Many take the position that the new Foreign Investment Law of 1973 for
the most part merely restated practices which had been evolving for a number
of years. One of the main provisions of this law was the establishment of the
Foreign Investment Commission comprised of the representatives of seven
relevant ministries and an Executive Secretary to supervise the ongoing af-
fairs of the Commission. The objectives of this law were to promote national
investment, control and regulate foreign investment, and stimulate a fair and
balanced development, consolidating the economic independence of the
country. The law defines what a foreign investment is, and then states that all
foreign investment performed in connection with the capital of the en-
terprise, for the acquisition of property and in the operations to which the law
refers, is subject to the provisions of the law. The law includes a provision
(traditionally referred to as a "Calvo clause") which subjects the foreign
investor to the same standard of treatment as a national investor, and obliges
the foreign investor to agree not to invoke the protection of its own govern-
ment in the event of a dispute concerning the investment.
The economic activities governed by the law are characterized in four
classes:
1. Those reserved to the State':
(a) hydrocarbons and basic petrochemicals;
(b) exploitation of radioactive minerals and generation of nuclear
energy;
(c) mining as referred to in the relevant mining law;
(d) public utilities (for example, electricity, railroads, and radio-
telegraph communications).
2. Those reserved to Mexican corporations with provisions in their char-
ters excluding foreigners (a foreign exclusion clause) 6:
(a) radio and television broadcasting companies;
(b) transportation (including urban, interurban, and federal roads;
automotive transportation; national air; and maritime);
(c) forestry exploitation;
(d) gas distribution;
(e) any others stipulated by specific law or regulation.
'Foreign Investment Law, supra note 1, art. 4.
6Id. art. 4.
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3. Those in which foreign capital may participate as specified':
(a) exploitation and utilization of mineral substances;
(1) ordinary concessions, 49 percent maximum;
(2) special concessions for national mining reserves, 34 percent
maximum;
(b) secondary petrochemicals, 40 percent;
(c) manufacture of automobile vehicle components, 40 percent;
(d) others prescribed in specific laws or regulations.
4. Those that are unspecified permit foreign investment up to 49 percent,
provided the capital does not have the power of management of the
enterprise.
The law reiterated the provision existing since the Constitution of 1917
(Article 27) that foreigners and foreign corporations, along with Mexican
corporations with foreign participation, were prohibited from acquiring
direct ownership of land and water within a strip 100 kilometers along the
border and fifty kilometers along the coastal frontiers. A decree of April 29,
1971, however, sanctioned the acquisition of property within the prohibited
zone by foreigners through the means of trusts (fideicomisos) for a term of
not more than thirty years, as being consistent with both the Constitution and
Mexico's economic development. This replaced the prestanombre or straw-
man system designed to accomplish the same result by holding title in some-
one else's name. The 1971 provision is continued in the Foreign Investment
Law.
Foreign acquisitions of Mexican interests of more than 25 percent of the
capital or more than 49 percent of the fixed assets of established enterprises
require approval from the Commission. In addition, the Commission must
approve expansion to new economic activity, or new lines of products by
existing enterprises with foreign participation. These provisions caused con-
siderable confusion and controversy at the outset, and this controversial area
was later defined into three issues:
1. New establishments;
2. New economic activity;
3. New lines of products.
These issues all involve the activities of foreign investors who were in busi-
ness in Mexico before the effective date of the law. It does not require much
imagination to envision a situation where an ongoing business desires to add
a line of products, to change the application of one process from X to Y (or
merely to add Y as a second application), or the straightforward matter of
expansion of its production and distribution facilities. Subsequently, Resolu-
tion No. 8 was issued as a ruling by the Commission, giving blanket authori-
zation for a new establishment if, and only if, the new establishment was
created exclusively for administration or warehousing purposes (not the nor-
'ld. art. 5.
'Id. art. 5.
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mal or ordinary manner of the company's activities) and providing that the
Commission receive the necessary administrative information. Any factory,
plant, shop, business, store, office, warehouse, storage facilities, or adminis-
trative offices, whether referred to as a branch, agency, or any other designa-
tion and regardless of whether it was owned or leased, fell within the approval
requirements of the law, unless it qualified for the blanket authorization
mentioned above.
With respect to new fields of economic activity and new lines of products,
the Commission issued Resolution No. 16 in September 1977 which also
attempted to clarify some of the controversy and confusion surrounding
those issues. Other resolutions issued by the Commission attempted to clarify
such items as: relocation of commercial, industrial, and services establish-
ments;9 closing of new establishments;' transfer of shares between investors
belonging to the same group;" and acquisitions of more than 25 percent of
the capital by foreign investors. 2 In all of the resolutions it was made clear by
the Commission that the same general criteria would be considered in deter-
mining whether the particular transaction required approval of the Commis-
sion. The criteria was generally similar to that set forth in the law itself, which
listed seventeen items to be considered by the Commission. 3 In summary,
they include strong policy guidelines on the part of a developing country to
attempt to stimulate its social and economic development, promote exports,
produce indigenous technology, decentralize industry, create more jobs and
raise the skill of the work force, and stabilize the balance of payments.
The law provided the usual penalties for failure to register the investment,
including the characterization of the agreement as null and void, the
withholding of the right by the subsidiary to pay dividends to the foreign
parent (denying tax deductibility to such payments), and providing fines and
prison sentences for anyone who violated or cooperated in the violation of
these laws. One final important provision of the law was that the Maquila-
doras were excluded from the ownership restrictions set forth in the laws,
although they still could not own the land outright. This will be referred to
later.'"
IV. Laws Affecting Transfer of Technology
An equally important pillar in this foundation affects the transfer of badly
needed technology into Mexico. Many studies have been conducted by in-
ternational (United Nations) agencies as well as by certain governments, in-
cluding the Mexican government, the results of which indicate that a consid-
erable number of abuses have been committed by the use of licensing




"Supra note 1, art. 9.
"See Part V infra.
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agreements for many years. Since the development of indigenous technology
is essential to the economic and social development of the country, deter-
minations were made to attempt to introduce regulations and control systems
to minimize the abuses and begin the process of reducing dependency on
foreign technology in the long run. One of the objectives of the Law on
Transfer of Technology is the attempt to obtain unrestricted use of the tech-
nology, as opposed to a limited right to use it for a limited period of time. The
objectives which the Technology Transfer Law attempted to accomplish were
also served by the introduction of a new Industrial Property Code three years
thereafter.
The Transfer of Technology Law
The Law on the Registration of Transfer of Technology and the Use and
Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks became effective on January 29,
1973.1' The two major provisions of this law include the identification or
definition of the acts or agreements which are the object of the law, and the
establishment of a comprehensive list of "restrictive" clauses which, if in-
cluded, would require denial of registration.
On the other hand, the law identified and defined the types of transactions
which it required to be registerd under the newly created National Registry of
the Transfer of Technology (NRTT):
(a) licenses for the use and exploitation of trademarks;
(b) licenses for the exploitation of patents of invention, improvements,
industrial designs and drawings;
(c) supply of know-how by means of plans, diagrams, designs, instruc-
tions, formulae, models, specifications, training or qualification of
personnel, and other methods;
(d) provision of basic and detail engineering for plant installations or for
the manufacture of products;
(e) technical assistance in any form;
(f) services of administration and operation of companies (management
contracts or administrative contracts).
The second major thrust of this law was the definition of the so-called
prohibited clauses, some requiring mandatory (per se) denial of registration
and others allowing a certain degree of flexibility and negotiations between
the parties and the Registry. Those requiring mandatory denial were as fol-
lows:
(a) where the technology was identified as being freely available in Mex-
ico;
(b) where the license agreement contained an exclusive grantback obliga-
tion;
"Industrial Property Code, note 2 supra.
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(c) where the agreement placed limitations on the research and develop-
ment activity of the recipient;
(d) where the agreement placed limitations on exports of the product;
(e) where the agreement was for an excessive term (the maximum allowed
was ten years);
(f) where the applicable law or jurisdictions provided within the law were
not Mexican.
For the other clauses listed, the law essentially creates a presumption of
restrictiveness, thus requiring denial of the agreement unless the party pre-
senting the agreement could establish to the satisfaction of the Ministry that
the agreement was in the best interest of the country. In other words, these
provisions were negotiable:
(a) where the royalty or fee was deemed to be excessive (royalty ranges
evolved over a period of time based on the product category or indus-
trial sector);
(b) where the supplier was permitted to intervene in the management of the
recipient or his technology (this category became increasingly impor-
tant after two or three years of the NRTT's existence).
(c) where the recipient was obliged to acquire tools, equipment, or raw
materials from a specified source, usually the supplier (the traditional
tie-in clause);
(d) where the use of complementary technology was prohibited;
(e) where the output was sold exclusively to the supplier;
(f) where the agreement required the recipient to use the supplier's person-
nel;
(g) where the agreement imposed production, volume, or sales price limits
on the recipient; and
(h) where the agreement required sales representation by the supplier in
Mexico.
The agreements which contained these latter (negotiable) provisions were
for the most part approved when the supplier alone or the recipient and
supplier jointly were able to establish to the Registry one of the following:
that the fee or royalty was justified by the unique nature of the technology, or
the tie-in or other nominal restriction was in fact a protection to the recipient
by assuring him a guaranteed source of supply at a guaranteed level of qual-
ity, or where the guaranteed availability of the supplier's personnel would
assure the satisfactory practice of the process or the patent, or would provide
the necessary technical assistance to assist the recipient in starting up his
operation.
Exceptions were made in the law for the entrance of technicians for emer-
gency or other related situations, or the installation and repair teams that are
common to the start-up of a new plant. These transactions were not required
to be registered.
And finally, this law provided, like the Foreign Investment Law, an excep-
tion for the Maquiladora plants.
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The Law on Inventions and Trademarks
This new Industrial Property Code became effective on February 10,
197616 and replaced the previous Industrial Property Code which had been
effective since 1943. The law contains some important provisions regarding
patents and trademarks. With respect to inventions (patents), it created a
Certificate of Invention patterned after the Soviet model, granting fewer
rights than a traditional patent. It reduced the duration of the term of a
patent to ten years (now counted from date of grant instead of filing date,
leaving a net reduction of two to three years), and established that same term
for the Certificate of Invention. It reduced the fields of patentable subject
matter, eliminating pharmaceuticals, beverages and foodstuffs, fertilizers,
herbicides and pesticides, among others. Finally, it introduced the require-
ment that patents must be "worked" within three years or be subject to the
compulsory licensing and/or forfeiture requirements for public policy rea-
sons. It is, of course, too early to analyze whether or not the potentially
serious effects of this last provision will be enforced. Mexican government
studies had indicated that a very high percentage of patents in these target
areas, particularly pharmaceuticals and the food and beverage categories,
were owned by foreigners and were not being used or "worked." The re-
sponse from the pharmaceutical industry on the latter point generally points
out that the prior Mexican patent legislation prohibited the patenting of a
product in that industry, and extended protection only to the process used in
its production. As a result, these companies were forced to patent the process
that was intended, and every other conceivable alternative, in order to protect
the compound or product involved. This obviously resulted in a significant
amount of patent applications which were granted but never used.
In addition, the law contains some controversial provisions regarding
trademarks. The terms were reduced to five years from date of filing, but
unlimited renewals were granted. The law requires the trademark to be effec-
tively used or "worked" within three years from the date of issue, or be
subject to cancellation. The law included extensive Proof of Use criteria,
which were augmented with subsequent regulations issued in October 1976
and later in 1978. Finally the law provided for compulsory licensing of trade-
marks for public interest reasons.
The most controversial provision affecting trademarks was the require-
ment established in this law to link foreign trademarks which were used on
products manufactured in Mexico with an equally prominent original (new)
Mexican mark. The law generated so much controversy, however, and there
were so many meetings betwen various Mexican (and foreign) groups and
Mexican government officials, that the government eventually issued a de-
cree in December 1978 extending the deadline for compliance until the end of
1979. That decree also provided that additional extensions could be issued by
'61d.
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the Ministry as it deemed appropriate. The prevailing opinion of Mexican
attorneys and business executives seemed to be that the government intended
to ameliorate the effects of this law, since it appeared to have potentially
counterproductive implications.
Reduced Foreign Payments
Before the Mexican Registry (NRTT) was merged into the Foreign Invest-
ment Office, officials published figures indicating there had been a savings in
royalty payments of approximately (United States) $500 million in the five-
year period the law had been in effect. This amounts to a tremendous savings
or reduction in the burden of foreign exchange for the country.
Analysis of other statistics published by the Registry indicated the seven
most common reasons for denial of registration of technology transfer agree-
ments in those early years were as follows:
1. Royalty rates too high 85% +
2. Output and price restrictions 39%
3. Unreasonable terms 38%
4. Foreign courts and law 23%
5. Management intervention 22%
6. Grantback requirements 21%
7. Export restrictions 17%
It is known, however, that many of the agreements that were rejected on the
first presentation were renegotiated when their provisions were modified,
and the majority of them were subsequently accepted with terms believed to
be more acceptable to Mexico.
The meaning of all this was clear. There was increased government inter-
vention in the negotiations in order to attempt to equalize the bargaining
power and to strengthen the local industries. One wonders whether the Mexi-
can private sector was ever asked whether it in fact wanted State intervention
to help it accomplish these objectives.
V. Maquiladora or In-Bond Assembly Programs
The third major pillar of this foundation was a law passed in 1965,17 with
multiple objectives. One of the primary objectives, when government plan-
ners foresaw severe population increases for the next couple of decades, and
thus substantial requirements for job creation, was a need to improve border
conditions on the Mexican side of the United States border. This may have
been triggered by the end of the United States bracero program and the need
to provide jobs for those formerly employed Mexican workers clustered near
the borders.
The idea was to authorize the creation of assembly plants by United States
manufacturers where there existed an abundance of labor at lower costs,
'Programa Nacional Fronteriza, note 3 supra.
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accessibility of transportation, and the application of certain United States
laws,' 8 which provided special treatment for certain products exported into
the United States from a foreign country which contain substantial United
States content and related considerations. Materials shipped from the United
States to Mexico entered the country in bond (bonded warehouses) on ar-
rival. The materials were processed and returned to the exporting country, in
this case the United States. This permitted United States companies to com-
pete with imports to the United States from countries like Hong Kong, Japan
and Taiwan. These products have also been competing successfully in the
United States export market. Many of the plants that were established under
the program have sister plants on the United States side of the border owned
by the same parent company.
There were no Mexican import or export duties imposed on these mate-
rials. A four percent sales tax was applied to all Mexican components as-
sembled and re-exported with the product, and state taxes varied from three
to five percent in the different Mexican states.
In 1972, a resolution was passed amending this law and providing certain
modifications to streamline this very successful program. Assembly plants
were permitted to be located anywhere within the country, not just in the
border areas. Special rules were provided for the importation and bonding.
The materials were shipped from the United States into bond on arrival, but
since 1972 bonding could be arranged on an annual basis. A series of forms
were provided for the necessary authorizations. Owners of assembly plants
could also request permission for a small pecentage of their products to be
sold in the domestic Mexican market, assuming certain conditions were met.
Certain general criteria were of course considered prior to the establish-
ment of an assembly plant by a United States company. First, of course, was
the question of site selection. Secondly, the analysis included examination of
the benefits of adopting a sister plant approach. Next it was necessary to
verify the product content and identify any special rules governing import to
the United States (such as explosives). Finally, the analysis involved the tradi-
tional examination of how or in what form the firm would incorporate in
Mexico. Would it be through a wholly owned foreign corporation? Or would
the arrangement lend itself better to a branch of the foreign corporation, or
possibly a proprietorship? Leasing of the plant was an alternative examined
and adopted by some, and that also could be arranged through a branch or a
subsidiary. Those that established subsidiaries, despite rules permitting 100
percent ownership, frequently considered the possibility of a joint venture.
The law of course required the company to register as an assembly plant
operation and provided for a series of approvals for the necessary operations
to be performed. Among others, this included authorizations and arrange-
ment for the bonds to be posted and for the various permits and licenses to
import and export.
"TSUS 806.3. 807.
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VI. Industrial Development Program
In February and March 1979 the Mexican government issued its new Incen-
tive Program for Industrial Development through a series of four decrees.' 9
The general objectives of the program clearly identify it as the fourth pillar of
the legal foundation, and early results indicate a direct interrelationship with
the Foreign Investment, Technology Transfer and Maquiladora policies.
The law sets forth the national plan for industrial development of the
country. It creates a National Commission of Industrial Development, an
inter-ministerial commision (like the Foreign Investment Commission) au-
thorized to facilitate the implementation of the expressed goals. Although
Mexico has had previous industrial promotion laws, this appears to be the
first time that such a coordinated set of fiscal and other incentives has been
introduced in order to stimulate the specific accomplishment of defined seg-
ments of a broad national plan.
Those goals include reaching full employment by the end of the century;
reorienting production toward basic consumer goods (durable and nondura-
ble); developing high-productivity industrial sectors capable of exporting
and more efficiently substituting imports; decentralizing to the extent possi-
ble the concentration of economic activity by channeling investments toward
the coasts, border zones and other localities outside the three major industrial
zones (Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey); and generally improving
the integration (especially vertical) of the industrial sector to make better use
of the country's natural resources (adding more value in the processing
thereof) and develop a strong, competitive capital goods sector. Included is a
desire to improve the productive efficiency of the agricultural sector, includ-
ing foodstuffs and agricultural equipment.
The tools provided by this plan, which has identified short- (one-year),
medium- (1979-82) and long-term goals (1990), include differential rates for
industrial energy (discounts up to 30 percent for natural gas, residual fuel oil
and electric power by locating plants in various designated zones) and dis-
counts of 30 pecent off prices of important basic petrochemical products
when new facilities comply with requirements to export a minimum of 25
percent of product for at least three years.
Another tool is a fiscal (tax) incentive arrangement designed to promote
and stimulate investment in priority activities (especially capital goods), de-
concentrate industrial production by locating in priority zones, and increase
employment. A series of tax and investment credits are available for qualify-
ing investments.
Job creation credits and favorable accounting treatment in specified cases,
and more attractive financing for qualifying firms are other incentives of-
fered under this comprehensive plan.
A clearly defined goal to strengthen small and medium-size companies
emerges from careful analysis of the plan, consistent with the belief that such
"See note 4 supra.
372 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
firms are more labor intensive, and with the desire to correct some oligopolis-
tic imbalances which the government apparently assumes to be harmful. De-
pending on the actual effect on companies of this size, this effort may support
the stated goal of increasing the efficiency of industrial integration in basic
and secondary industrial sectors and consumer and agricultural sectors.
Among the priority zones identified are those rich in raw materials where
adjacent processing industries can be developed. Other zones designated as
priority include Pacific and Gulf Coast port locations which will facilitate
growth by easing handling of imports essential for industrialization, and
promote the transportation and export of manufactured goods. Areas clus-
tered along parts of the natural gas distribution network where infrastruc-
tural conditions favor building plants are also priority zones. Some coastal
and border areas that are designated as priorities also gain benefits under
other laws and incentive policies, such as the Maquiladora program.
The catch is that these incentives are only offered to "Mexican" investors
which are so defined under the Foreign Investment Law. What this means is
that the Mexican government wants foreigners to come to Mexico and set up
a new plant, participate in the rapidly growing market, and create new jobs to
employ the expanding work force, but they want the foreigner to enter in a
minority equity position with a majority Mexican partner. They want the
foreign capital and technology as a complement and supplement to indige-
nous resources.
The Mexican government, through the Ministry of Patrimony and Indus-
trial Development and other cooperating ministries, has already shown its
determination to implement this plan. In addition to the Customs Assess-
ment Law2" which was designed to increase efficiency of tariff policy and
improve processing of imports by modifying the tariff and import licensing
system, the Ministry has given favorable treatment to applications for regis-
tration of foreign investments and technology to firms meeting some of the
objectives of the Industrial Development Plan.
VII. Joint Ventures
It should be clear by now that the trend of the law and policy in Mexico,
beginning with the Revolution of 1910 and the Constitution of 1917, has been
to encourage the participation of foreign capital blended with and supple-
mentary to Mexican capital. Thus, joint ventures are the favored mode for
encouraging foreign participation in the economic and social development of
the Republic.
United States companies, however, have traditionally resisted the idea of
foreign investment without retaining both majority equity and control. Re-
cent trends in Mexico, Brazil and other Latin American countries, as well as
elsewhere, have raised familiar questions with each opportunity that is pre-
sented.
2 Customs Assessment Law (effective July 1979).
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No discussion of joint ventures should start off without emphasizing the
importance of the selection of the partner. This is not a legal matter, but all of
the laws, rules, regulations and policies of the government are clearly second-
ary to the selection of a joint venture partner who shares your interests vir-
tually across the board. A critical aspect of the Foreign Investment and other
laws is how these laws are interpreted and applied. This depends to a great
extent on the people who are in office and the currently prevailing political
pressures. It is therefore important to understand their backgrounds and
what has influenced their thinking.
This is one of the essential elements that one's local partner will provide.
He must know the overall local environment and maintain a constant contact
with changing events and changing personalities. It is very likely that he is
monitoring all of the necessary elements and people for his pre-existing in-
terests and other operations. In other words, his feet are already in the fire.
Another element that one's local partner can provide is the ability to adapt
the technology to the prevailing conditions in his country. It has been stated
previously that one of the major objectives of the Mexican government is to
create indigenous technology. Among other things, this means there is recog-
nition that the marketplace and the infrastructure prevailing in Mexico differ
from those in the United States. The capital equipment, techniques, and even
products which are effective here are not necessarily effective in Mexico. The
mentality of labor-intensive operations prevails for the most part throughout
Mexico, but has long since disappeared from the scene in this country. As a
result, many of the designs and much of the experience and know-how incor-
porated in American products and processes are capital intensive due to long-
prevailing high costs of labor. In Mexico, therefore, equivalent parts of the
product or process could be substituted without sacrificing performance cri-
teria or quality, and thereby more jobs would be created and locally available
resources would be utilized. This arrangement has been proven successful in
Mexico, Brazil and other intermediate-stage developing countries, and
should not be overlooked.
It has been stated by leading industrialists who have been involved in
successful joint ventures in Mexico that some of the prerequisites for their
beneficial results have included the necessary long-term affinity, which be-
gins with appropriate attitudes on the part of each partner, and the develop-
ment of mutual trust. The objectives of each partner are fully discussed at the
outset before the deal is struck, and it is established that the objectives of each
are consistent. Then the local partner capitalizes on his position in the coun-
try to seek and select the top- and middle-level management talent which the
operation will require.
The subject of management and control is capable of a more attractive
solution in Mexico than in other developing countries. The bylaws of the
joint company may contain the necessary protection for the minority share-
holder. Generally, different requirements are provided for two types of meet-
ings contemplated in these kinds of shareholder agreements in Mexico. The
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ordinary meeting requires the presence of 50 percent of the voting share-
holders, and the extraordinary meeting requires 75 percent. The latter type of
meeting deals generally with the following kinds of issues:
(a) increase or reduction of capital;
(b) transformation by merger, acquisition, and the like;
(c) changes in purposes or objectives of the company;
(d) addition of new product lines;
(e) other major policy decisions.
The question of technical assistance fees should be agreed upon by the
parties beforehand. The chairman of the board of a major Mexican industrial
group stated his opinion that technology should not be utilized as a capital
contribution because it limits the flexibility of the negotiations. He cited an
example of a recent difficulty in a joint venture arrangement where the prob-
lems were simplified by separating the technology from the capital. In the
course of his experience, the fees for technology and technical assistance had
frequently been the basis of problems arising between the joint venture
partners.
VIII. Stock Offerings
It has also been suggested that a company can Mexicanize its existing in-
vestment by offering shares publicly on the securities market, thereby dilut-
ing the control of national investors. This has been an increasingly favored
approach the last few years. However, there have been reports of several
situations where public offerings were prevented by government policy be-
cause of unfavorable circumstances prevailing in particular cases. This possi-
bility will be more attractive as the Mexican capital market strengthens and
expands in the future.
In addition, at least four major Mexican financial groups or institutions
are known to have become increasingly active in financing joint ventures
recently and have issued statements of their interest in continuing this trend.
These include SOMEX, NAFINSA, BANAMEX and BANCOMER, of
which NAFINSA and SOMEX are government and the others private. Other
Mexican investment banks and financial institutions are becoming more ac-
tive and reforms in capital market rules are being discussed.
IX. Other Considerations and Conclusion
Two other aspects will be mentioned in passing, as they are considered
important enough to be included at this point. Late in 1978, the government
decided to reduce the requirements for import licenses of a number of prod-
ucts. There appears to be a trend of removing some protection from ineffi-
cient Mexican producers to improve the quality of production, decrease
prices, and generally improve competitive efficiency to prepare them for
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competition in international markets. This may be a combined result of
"Chicago shool" economic thinking and Mexico's decision to negotiate
with the GATT-for possible membership. 2"
It appears that a tax system will be replacing the import licensing system
over the next few years. In this context a value-added tax was enacted and
became effective on January 1, 1980. Beginning at that date, the value-added
tax (VAT) replaced the commercial revenues tax and seventeen other taxes,
including taxes on the resale of oil and lubricants, cement production, rubber
tires and inner tubes, forestry exploitation, the fishing industry and others.
VAT is to be applied to property transfers, services (except from profes-
sionals), property rentals, and importation of goods and services. Exports
are exempt from VAT and the exporter may request a refund of the tax to be
passed on to him by his suppliers, which refund may be up to ten percent of
the value of the exported goods and services.
Finally, a word will be mentioned about naturalization and immigration.
The General Population Law of 1947 as amended and regulated established
the classification of foreigners-resident or entering Mexico. The three clas-
sifications are non-immigrant (no inmigrante), permanent resident alien
(inmigrado), and immigrant (inmigrante). The latter two provide for resi-
dency of some duration, while the former is intended for temporary visits.
The immigrant visa can lead to permanent resident alien status, but has been
increasingly more difficult to obtain in recent years as the Government pre-
fers not to add foreigners to their permanent working force. This is under-
standable in view of the priority given to job creation to absorb the expanding
work force. The Labor Law has traditionally permitted a ratio of one for-
eigner with a work force of ten Mexicans under specified conditions. Ob-
viously here, as throughout the legal structure, the emphasis is on reducing
the number of foreigners required in the operation, while training and up-
grading the skills of the nationals. The objective is for Mexicans to be trained
to assume all of the responsibilities of running any given Mexican operation.
Throughout this summary one may infer a strong trend toward Mexican-
ization or nationalization of foreign industry by the Mexican Government.
This summary is meant to provide a background and a context within which it
could be better understood. Another way to look at it is that "nationalism" is
another word for "patriotism," depending on which side of the table you are
sitting.
2 On March 18, 1980, the forty-second anniversary of nationalization of the Mexican oil
industry, the President announced that it was "not a timely moment for Mexico to enter that
trading system." The internal debate within Mexico had been long and more public than any
other significant debate in recent memory. The President stated publicly that the GATT safe-
guard codes raised concern to Mexico in relation to the global energy plan that the country had
proposed at the United Nations. Other Mexican officials suggested that joining the GATT would
dilute the superior bargaining power which petroleum has bestowed upon the country. In any
event, Mexico clearly has reserved the right to take a second look at a more opportune time.
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